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) 
} 
Plaintiff- Respondent, 
v. 
DENNIS A. HUNTER I 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 
10893 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case involved the criminal prosecution and 
conviction of Dennis A. Hunter for the charge of assault 
with a deadly weapon, in the Third Judicial District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
DIS POSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
A complaint was filed in the District Court of 
Summit County on November 2, 19~6, by Ted London, 
a member of the Utah Highway Patrol, charging Dennis A. 
1 
Hunter with the crime of assault with a deadly weapon. 
Trial was held in the District Court of Salt Lake County 
on the 8th day of December, 1966. After a jury trial 
2 
the appellant, Mr. Hunter, was found guilty of assault 
with a deadly weapon. On the 30th day of December, 
1966, the appellant was sentenced to an indeterminate 
term of imprisonment not to exceed five years in accord-
ance with§ 76-7-6, Utah Code Anno. (1953). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant, Dennis A. Hunter, respectfully 
submits that his criminal conviction of assault with a 
deadly weapon should be reversed and that a new trial 
of the charges against him be ordered. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On April 23, 1966, the appellant, Dennis A. Hunter, 
and one Steve Clark, were involved in a high-speed 
automobile chase with pursuing Utah Highway Patrolmen. 
As the chase progressed up Echo Canyon, the two auto-
mobiles closed to within one or two car lengths of one 
another. At this point, one of the patrolmen leaned out 
of his car window and made as if to fire his pistol at 
the appellant and his companion (T. 38, 55 and 56}. As 
the appellant and his companion dropped lower in their 
seats to avoid being struck by the presumed pistol fire, 
the automobiles separated to a distance greater than 
a hundred feet (T. 5 6). At this point, the appellant leaned 
out of his window and fired shots in the general direction 
of the pursuing patrol car (T. 39 and 56). 
At the appellant's trial, no evidence was produced 
to show that any of appellant's pistol shots struck any-
where near the automobile in which the pursuing patrol-
men were riding. In fact, the chief witness for the State 
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testified that he did not notice any results of the appellant' 
firing (T • 4 8) . 
The State further failed to produce any direct proof 
of the intentment with which the appellant acted while 
firing his pistol, save the fact that the gun was pointed 
in a general direction toward the patrolmen. All of this 
occurring while both automobiles were engaged in ex-
tensive evasive maneuvers and while both automobiles 
were some distance from one another. 
At the conclusion of the presentation of evidence, 
counsel for the appellant requested an instruction on the 
includability of the lesser offense of wimple assault 
within the charge of assault with a deadly weapon 
(R. 17 and 21). The lower Court rejected this requested 
instruction stating that it felt that the issue at hand was 
either assault with a deadly weapon or nothing (T. 67). 
Further statements by the Court indicate that there 
might have been some confusion as to the nature of a 
criminal assault. The Court apparently took the position 
that an assault would be criminal only if the assaulting 
party clearly intended to kill or physically injure a party 
CT. 6 7 and 6 8}. According to the Court, any other form 
of assault would not be criminal in nature, but would 
merely be a civil matter {T. 68}. To this, counsel for 
the appellant took due exception (T. 67, 68 and 75). 
Following an interrupted deliberation by the jury, 
(T. 76) a verdict of guilty of the charge of assault with 
a deadly weapon was returned against the appellant. 
It is from this conviction the appellant now takes this 
appeal. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED GRIEVOUS AND 
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN REFUSING TO GRANT APPELLANT'S 
REQUESTED INSTRUCTION ON THE INCLUDABILITY OF THE 
LESSER OFFENSE or SIMPLE ASSAULT WITHIN THE CHARGE 
OF ASSAULT WITH A DEADLY WEAPON. 
There are three defined elements of the offense 
of assault with a deadly weapon with which the appellant 
in this case is charged. The Utah Supreme Court in the 
ca.se of State v. Bc:rkas, 91Utah574, 580, 65 P.2d 1130 
(193 7) has defined these elements as being: 11 (1) An 
assault; (2) use of a deadly weapon; (3) an intent to do 
bodily harm. 11 
Implicit within the description of assault with a 
deadly weapon is t~e rule of law that so-called simple 
assault is a nec:_essary and included lesser offense 
within the greater offense. In the Barkas case, the Utah 
Supreme Court fully accepted this rule of law and stated 
that: 
There can be no doubt that a charge of assault 
with intent to do bodily harm, includes also 
simple assault, because that assault must be 
proved as a necessary element of the greater 
offense. (Emphasis added.) 
See also the case of People v. Bruce, 40 Cal. Rptr. 877 
891 (D.C. Cal. App., 1964); "[S]imple assault ••• is 
a necessarily included offense within the charge of force 
likely to produce great bodily harm." 
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By elevating simple assault to the stature of a 
"necessary element" of the offense of assault with a 
deadly weapon, the Utah Court has likewise imposed 
the requirement that an instruction on this included offense 
must be given to the jury. The result of this rule of law 
therefore being that a trial court's failure to present the 
jury with such an instruction, with such an alternative 
verdict, is generally considered to be reversible error. 
The Court in the case of State v. Hymas, 64 Utah 2 85, 
286, 230 Pac. 349 (1924}, pointed out that "where the 
accused is charged with a greater offense, he is never-
theless entitled to an instruction that the jury may convict 
him of a lesser offense .... " And, in the Barkas 
case, the Court at page 580 states that: 
Since "simple assault" is a necessary element 
of the offense charged or any offense included 
therein, . . . it was error on the part of the 
trial court to refuse to submit that possible 
verdict to the jury . 
By refusing or failing to give such instruction, such 
an alternative, the trial judge effectively usurps the fact-
finding duties of the jury. This Court has long recognized 
the danger inherent in such usurpation by a trial judge 
and has indicated its reluctance to uphold such actions. 
This marked reluctance was clearly indicated in the opinion 
in the Hymas case at page 287 where the Court states 
that: 
It is, however, always a delicate matter for a 
trial court to withhold from the jury the right to 
find the accused guilty of a lesser or included 
offense, and determine the question of the 
state of evidence as a matter of law. 
11 
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The danger that arises by such a refusal to give 
an instruction on lesser included offenses is clearly 
demonstrated in the situation where the evidence is of a 
nature that points to some degree of guilt on the defendant's 
part. Jf the jury has no choice save that of acquittal or 
conviction on the greater offense, it is then placed 
squarely on the horns of a dilemma. For to acquit the 
defendant is to release a man the jury feels is guilty, yet 
to convict him of the greater offense is to find him 
guilty of a charge greater in degree than that the jury 
feels is warranted by the evidence. The refusal by 
che Court to give the jury a third alternative of a lesser 
offense then destroys the jury's right and power to pass 
judgment on the evidence. But more than this, the 
refusal to give this instruction weakens dangerously the 
rightful presumption of innocence given to an accused and 
reduces the burden of proof placed on the State. 
This fact-finding role of the jury becomes 
critical when it is realized that in order to convict a person 
accused with assault with a deadly weapon, the jury must, 
as a matter of law, determine the intent with which the 
accused acted. See State v. Barkas, supra. Likewise, 
due to the nature of this offense the intent of the actor 
generally must be inferred from the circumstances 
surrounding his actions rather than by direct proof. 
It becomes clear then, that the jury may determine as a 
matter of fact that the intention that may be inferred 
or derived from the avidence is too weak to sustain a 
charge of assault with a deadly weapon. To remove such 
determination from the jury by refusing to give an instructioi 
on lesser included offenses is to deprive the fact-finders 
of their most basic and important obligation and to 
cast the trial judge in a role for which he is ill-
suited under our judicial system. 
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That the foregoing line of reasoning applies to 
the instant case is apparent from a review of the evidence 
presented at the trial. In describing the alleged assault, 
the State's witnesses testified that the firing of the pistol 
by the appellant took place under extremely adverse 
conditions. The appellant fired his shots while in an 
automobile that was engaged in extensive and evasive 
maneuvering at high speeds. (T. 38, 39, 56, and 57). 
The distance between the appellant's automobile and that 
of the State trooper's was, in the words of the witness 
Denos, "a hundred feet or better." (T. 56) It is 
therefore no wonder that the State's witnesses conceded 
that not only were they and their automobile not struck 
by any of these shots, but, and more importantly, the 
appellant's shots were apparently so wide of the mark 
that the witnesses had no idea of where these shots 
went. (T. 48) In fact, on cross-examination, trooper 
London fin'ally admftted that, "All I saw, that the gun 
was pointed in my direction." (T. 48) 
Added to these facts is the additional point that 
in order for the ap)Cellant to aim the pistol at the 
complJining party, trooper London (R. 2), it was 
necessary for the appellant, who was in the right-hand 
side of the fleeing automobile, (T. 39 and 56) to twist 
his body around and fire with his left hand across his 
body at an acute angle toward trooper London who was 
in the left-hand side of the pursuing automobile. (T. 36) 
The State completely failed to offer any direct 
evidence of, or further circumstantial evidence to portray 
the specific intent with which the appellant acted. 
This dearth of evidence coupled with the physical 
conditions as established by the State's witnesses 
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completely left the questions of intent open for decision 
by the jury. That this evidentiary condition requires 
jury determination as to the degree of the offense 
committed was recognized in the case of Barnishel v. 
Peo~, 347 P.2d 915, 918 (Colo., 1959): 
Where there is no evidence of the specific intent 
required to determine the defendant guilty of the 
precise offense charged in the information, or 
the evidence, as in this case, might be insufficient 
to remove the reasonable doubt which might be in 
the minds of the jury as to the intent, under the 
same evidence the defendant might be found 
guilty of simple assault. 
The jury in the instant case was not given the 
opportunity to decide the issue of reasonable doubt and 
its relationship to the question of the intent of the appellant 
The trial court rejected the instructions on lesser and 
included offenses requested by appellant's counsel. 
(T. 6 7) (It should also be noted that it is clear that the 
status of this evidence raised serious doubts and 
questions in the jurors' minds. At one point during its 
deliberation, the jury returned with a verdict with which 
not all of the jurors agreed. The foreman indicated that 
the jury had reached an impasse in its deliberations. 
(T. 76) Subsequent to the urgings by the trial court, the 
jury, after three hours of deliberation, returned a verdict 
of guilty. (T. 78)) 
In refusing the requested instruction, the lower 
Court gave a confusing interpretation to the law of 
assault with a deadly weapon. At page 67 of the 
official transcript, the Court states that "the evidence 
shows that a gun was loaded .... It's either with a 
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deac1ly weapon or noLhing under this evidence." This 
pC1sition is contrary to the law as pointed out in the 
R8rk21~;.cc1se at page 579 of the opinion: 
This, [action of assault] if done with the 
intention of frightening, or intimidating or 
interfering with Cordova would constitute a 
technical or simple assault, which is a 
threat or attempt to interfere with one's 
sense or feeling of physical security and 
put one in fear for his safety. 
See also the contradictory position taken by the lower 
Court on lines 16, 17, 18 and 19 at page 48 of the 
official transcript. 
The stcte of this evidence raised a sufficient 
question as to the intent with which the appellant acted. 
This was a matter for the jury and not the Court to decide. 
It is upon this wrongful refusal by the lower Court to 
grant the requested instruction on the lesser included 
offense of simple assault that this appeal is taken. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court 
committed grievous and reversible error in refusing to 
grant appellant's request for an instruction on the inclusio 
of the offense of simple assault in the charge of assault 
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with a deadly weapon and that appellant's conviction 
should, therefore, be reversed and a new trial ordered. 
Rer~ctfully submitted I 
,'~·; ·{~~T 
1 East 
niversity Club Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Appellant 
